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We systematically explore decision situations in which a decision maker bears responsibility for 
somebody else's outcomes as well as for her own in situations of payoff equality. In the gain domain 
we confirm the intuition that being responsible for somebody else's payoffs increases risk aversion. 
This is however not attributable to a 'cautious shift' as often thought. Indeed, looking at risk 
attitudes in the loss domain, we find an increase in risk seeking under responsibility. This raises 
issues about the nature of various decision biases under risk, and to what extent changed behavior 
under responsibility may depend on a social norm of caution in situations of responsibility versus 
naive corrections from perceived biases. To further explore this issue, we designed a second 
experiment to explore risk-taking behavior for gain prospects offering very small or very large 
probabilities of winning. For large probabilities, we find increased risk aversion, thus confirming 
our earlier finding. For small probabilities however, we find an increase of risk seeking under 
conditions of responsibility. The latter finding thus discredits hypotheses of a social rule dictating 
caution under responsibility, and can be explained through flexible self-correction models 
predicting an accentuation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory. An 
additional accountability mechanism does not change risk behavior, except for mixed prospects, in 
which it reduces loss aversion. This indicates that loss aversion is of a fundamentally different 
nature than probability weighting or utility curvature. Implications for debiasing are discussed. 
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1. Motivation 
Economic situations in which an agent takes decisions that affect others' outcomes as well as her 
own constitute a common class of phenomena. For instance, they represent situations in which a 
decision maker’s choices affect not only her own outcomes, but those of her family as well. Another 
common instance of such decision problems is the one of financial agency contracts in which the 
incentive structure of the agent coincides with the one of the principal. An example may be the one 
of executives that are compensated through company shares, or the one of a stock broker whose 
payoffs are determined by the outcomes of the investments she undertakes.  
Given the importance of such phenomena, it may seem surprising that we are only beginning 
to understand social influences on risk attitudes. Indeed, there is an extensive literature on 
individual decision making under risk and uncertainty (Abdellaoui et al., 2010; Slovic, 1987), as 
well as a substantial literature on risk attitude in agency problems and how to influence it through 
performance-contingent pay (Lefebvre & Vieider, 2010; Wiseman & Gomez-Majia, 1998). What is 
missing however is a direct comparison of risk attitudes when decisions are individual to situations 
in which decisions affect others as well as oneself. 
We explore the difference in risk attitudes between situations of decision-making for oneself 
and in situations of responsibility, i.e. situations in which the decision maker decides for others as 
well as herself. We explore such decisions for situations in which an anonymous other (the 
recipient) is affected by any outcomes that obtain in exactly the same way as the decision maker 
herself. This allows us to study possible changes in behavior in a clean way, excluding issues 
deriving e.g. from interpersonal relations or preferences over outcome distributions that may cause 
inequality concerns. Also, by making both the decision maker’s outcome and the recipient’s 
outcome dependent on the decision makers choice, the latter will bear an actual cost in terms of her 
own preferences by accommodating any presumed preferences of the recipient. 
To our best knowledge, the only paper that reports results about this issue under equal payoff 
assumptions is Bolton & Ockenfels (2010), although the authors report these results as an 
afterthought to their main results about inequality concerns and do not find statistically significant 
results due to their small sample size. We explore the issue systematically for risky choices in the 
gain domain, the loss domain, and the mixed domain. Indeed, individual risk attitudes have been 
found to differ systematically in the different domains (Abdellaoui, 2000; Booij, van Praag, & van 
de Kuilen, 2010; Schoemaker, 1990). To the extent that individual risk attitudes have been found to 
differ systematically, it is thus unclear how any increase in risk aversion under responsibility for 
large probabilities—if it indeed exists—would transfer to different outcome domains or probability 
levels. By adopting prospect theory (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979) as a descriptive theory for 3 
behavior under risk, we are able to examine the issue in more detail. 
The question of whether and how being responsible for others changes choice behavior also 
raises interesting questions about rationality concepts, social norms on risk taking, and the 
perceived acceptability of attitudes towards risks. This in turn has implications for ‘debiasing’, or 
simply changing risk attitudes in ways that may seem desirable. By comparing situations of 
individual decision making to situations of responsibility, and to decision-making under 
accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), for different probabilities and in different domains, we are 
able to examine the perceived acceptability of common individual decision making patterns under 
risk. To the extent that being responsible for others may act as a cognitive motivator for more 
careful consideration of the decision alternatives, we can draw conclusions about the perceived 
normative status of a type of behavior by observing if and in what direction people move from the 
individual baseline when responsible for others.  
We find that in the gain domain, being responsible for others as well as oneself does indeed 
increase risk aversion for medium to large probabilities, thus showing that Bolton & Ockenfels’ 
(2010) intuition was correct. In addition, we show that for pure loss prospects, risk seeking 
increases when subjects are responsible for others—thus giving an indication that risk seeking for 
losses is seen as ‘normative’, or at least as socially acceptable, in a way paralleling risk aversion for 
gains. Loss aversion on the other hand, being already strong in individual decisions, does not seem 
to increase when subjects are responsible for others. Introducing an additional accountability 
treatment, requiring decision makers to justify their decision in front of the recipient, is however 
found to reduce loss aversion, thus hinting at different mechanisms underlying loss aversion and 
probability weighting. In a second experiment aimed at exploring social norms on risk taking in the 
gain domain in more detail, we find that risk aversion further increases for large probabilities. When 
choices regard small probability prospects however, the overweighting of small probabilities 
typically found in individual decisions is further accentuated—thus hinting at the perceived 
normativity of probability weighting rather than a universal norm for risk aversion. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses risk attitudes and how they may be 
influenced by social contexts.  Section 3 describes the first experiment, with section 3.1 describing 
the methodology and section 3.2 presenting the results; section 3.3 presents results of an additional 
accountability treatment, and section 3.4 discusses the result of experiment 1 and derives 
hypotheses for experiment 2. Section 4 introduces experiment 2, with section 4.1 describing the 
methodology and section 4.2 presenting the results. Section 4.3 discusses the results of experiment 





2. Risk attitudes in social contexts 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in how social factors may influence decision 
making under risk. Such ‘social factors’ could take various forms, ranging from whether a decision 
is observed by somebody else or the decision maker observes somebody else’s decision, to whether 
one’s outcome depends on somebody else or one’s decision influences the outcome of somebody 
else (Trautmann & Vieider, 2010). We are interested in the latter category: do preferences over risky 
choices change when the decision influences somebody else’s outcomes as well as the ones of the 
decision maker? And if so, how? 
  To date there is very little evidence on this issue with the existing evidence appearing 
inconclusive. Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) hypothesize that risk aversion will increase under 
responsibility. However, their result fails to reach statistical significance. Indeed, their main results 
concern the effect of social comparison, so that they mainly examine choice behavior when 
outcomes may differ between the decision maker and the recipient. They find an increase in risk 
taking under conditions of responsibility when the safe options yields unequal payoffs, and 
particularly when such payoff asymmetry is unfavorable to the decision maker. In contrast, they 
find that under responsibility risk taking does not depend on whether the risky option yields unequal 
payoffs. 
In a somewhat related study from the game theory literature, Charness & Jackson (2009) 
have subjects play Rousseau’s stag hunting game against each other. They compare conditions in 
which one subjects simply plays against another, to one in which a second, passive, subject depends 
on each player. They find that under responsibility for someone else the efficient equilibrium 
obtains less frequently. While this may again be an indication for increased risk aversion under 
responsibility, it is not clear where such a risk may actually come from since it is not in the interest 
of any of the players to deviate from the efficient equilibrium unless they think the other player may 
deviate. Furthermore, the setup of the study again creates issues of inequality aversion, for while the 
recipient obtains the same payoffs as the decision maker, the strategic nature of the game implies 
that the opponent and her recipient may obtain very different payoffs. 
We aim to specifically exclude inequality concerns to filter out the pure effect of being 
responsible for somebody else's payoffs. In order to achieve this, the exact choice that determines 
the decision maker's payoff also determines the recipient's payoff, resulting in exactly the same 
outcome. This design thus allows us to isolate the effect of being responsible for somebody else as 
well as for oneself from any distributional issues (Rohde & Rohde, 2010). 
We propose to systematically examine the effect of responsibility on risk preferences 
throughout the outcome and probability domains. In order to facilitate that task, in what follows we 5 
will adopt a behavioral, and hence theory-neutral, definition of risk aversion. A decision maker will 
be defined as risk averse whenever she prefers the expected value of a prospect to the prospect 
itself; conversely, she will be defined as risk seeking whenever she prefers the prospect to a sure 
amount equivalent to the prospect in terms of expected value (Wakker, 2010). Risk aversion and 
risk seeking are thus relative terms, such that a decrease in risk aversion can be seen as equivalent 
to an increase in risk seeking. In our presentation of the results we recur to prospect theory—the 
prevalent descriptive theory of choice under risk and uncertainty today (Starmer, 2000; Wakker, 
2010). Under prospect theory, risk attitudes are described by utility curvature, loss aversion, and 
probability weighting (Köbberling & Wakker, 2005). 
While utility is generally found to be linear for small amounts like the ones used in typical 
experiments, probability weighting alone nevertheless predicts a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: 
risk aversion for medium to large probabilities of gains; risk seeking for small probability gains; 
risk aversion for small probability losses; and risk seeking for medium to large probability losses 
(Abdellaoui, 2000; Abdellaoui, l’Haridon & Zank, 2010; Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2000). In addition to 
probability weighting, for mixed prospects involving both gains and losses, risk attitudes are 
significantly influenced by loss aversion—the phenomenon according to which monetary losses are 
usually attributed greater weights than equivalent monetary gains (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & 
Paraschiv, 2007; Schmidt & Zank, 2005; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1992). 
Dissecting risk attitudes into its single elements has the advantage of permitting conclusions 
on the cognitive mechanisms behind the decision making processes one observes. Understanding 
the latter is in turn important for policy design and debiasing efforts (Bleichrodt, Pinto, & Wakker, 
2001). Arkes (1991) divides typical cognitive biases into there broad categories: 
 
1)  strategy-based errors; such errors are often due to ‘quick and dirty’ strategies, that 
are highly adaptive in environments in which decisions need to be taken quickly; 
they can generally be eradicated by giving subjects sufficient motivation 
2)  association-based errors; these are errors stemming from the application of decision 
rules devised for one category of events to events that appear superficially similar, 
but that are not; debiasing of such errors will generally prove more difficult, and 
may depend on one’s ability to uncover the fundamental differences in the 
apparently similar events; 
3)  psychophysically-based errors; such errors derive often from low sensitivity to 
relatively small changes; to the extent that it may be very difficult to acquire an 
eye for the finer differences, such errors are generally resistant to debiasing. 
 6 
The above categorization raises interesting issues for decision making under risk. It is generally 
thought that probability weighting—as well as utility curvature—belongs to the third category, and 
will thus be resistant to debiasing. Indeed, it has been found that neither probability weighting nor 
utility curvature are influenced by accountability, i.e. requiring decision makers to justify decision 
making processes (Vieider, 2008), while accountability requirements are generally effective at 
reducing biases that fall into the first two categories (Vieider & Tetlock, 2010). Also, higher 
financial incentives do not typically flatten out the probability weighting curve pushing it closer to 
linearity, although they do generally result in increased levels of risk aversion over the whole 
probability spectrum (Binswanger, 1980; Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992; Lefebvre, Vieider, & 
Villeval, 2010). 
  When it comes to loss aversion, however, there is some evidence that it may belong to the 
first category of biases, which—while being generally strong—also makes it unstable and hence 
relatively easy to debiase. Indeed, List (2004) found that experienced traders are not usually 
affected by loss aversion. Plott & Zeiler (2005) showed that the endowment effect could be 
eliminated by putting in place a number of measures. Vieider (2009) showed that having to justify 
one’s decision in front of the experimenter also reduces the incidence of loss aversion. 
  Given that we hypothesize different effects of accountability on probability weighting or 
utility curvature and loss aversion, it may be useful to discuss the issue in the light of Wegener & 
Petty's (1995) flexible self-correction model. The model postulates that people may shift away from 
their ‘natural’ or spontaneous behavior when motivated to do so. The extent to which they correct 
their behavior however, as well as the direction in which they correct it, will fundamentally depend 
on their naïve theory of the bias. To the extent that loss aversion may be perceived as a bias, we 
may thus see people shifting away from it. Probability weighting and utility curvature on the other 
hand seem to be different inasmuch as they are not generally recognized as decision biases. 
Differences in the underlying causes of biases and their consequence for debiasing efforts 
have important policy implications, inasmuch as probability weighting and loss aversion have been 
found to be the origin of a host of important real-world biases. Camerer (2000) showed how loss 
aversion can be used to explain a host of puzzling real-world decision phenomena. Probability 
weighting explains the simultaneous take-up of insurance and lottery play (Wakker, 2010). It has 
been used to explain risk-insurance against climate change disasters (Botzen & van den Bergh, 
2009). And it seems to be at the origin of reference point effects that have been observed in 
financial markets (Lefebvre & Vieider, 2010; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and for investment 




3. Experiment 1: Responsibility for gains, losses, and mixed prospects 
3.1. Experimental Design 
We designed a laboratory experiment in which we asked subjects to take binary decisions between 
two alternatives, that are presented to them on a computer screen. Payoffs always affect the decision 
maker and the recipient in a perfectly parallel manner in the responsibility treatment, so as to avoid 
issues of payoff inequality (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Rohde & Rohde, 2010). 
 
Subjects. Overall, 144 subjects were recruited from a subject pool at Ludwig-Maximilian’s 
University in Munich, Germany, via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment took roughly 1.5 
hours, and average earnings were €22.50. The experiments were run on computers using zTree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 46% of subjects were female, and the average age was 24.07 years. 
 
Task. Subjects were asked to choose between a safe prospect and a risky prospect. The safe prospect 
usually consisted in a sure amount of money, and sometimes in a prospect with lower volatility 
compared to the risk prospect. The risky prospect always gave 50–50 chance to obtain one of two 
outcomes. The prospects could comprise only positive amounts, only negative amounts, or both 
positive and negative amounts (see below). Overall, subjects had to make 40 choices, with the order 
of presentation as well as the position of the two prospects randomized for each subject. Subjects 
took decisions sequentially and had no opportunity to return to an earlier decision to revise it. All of 
the above was common knowledge and explained in the instructions. 
 
Prospects. The 40 prospects were constructed systematically in the following way: 
-  Basic prospect pairs: We chose 5 different basic prospects with five different stake levels to 
serve as a foundation from which all other prospects were constructed. These five prospect 
pairs thus always offered a choice between a safe payment (of 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 Euros 
respectively), and a prospect providing a 50% chance to win twice the safe amount or zero 
otherwise. 
-  Pure Loss Prospects: The mirror image of the base case where every amount was negative 
instead of positive. These prospects were inserted to directly compare risk taking behavior 
for gains and losses. 
-  Mixed prospects: To obtain these prospects, the safe amount in the basic prospects was 
subtracted from all outcomes, thus obtaining a prospect with an expected value of €0. E.g., 
the mixed prospect derived from basic prospect pair 2 would be a choice between a sure 
payment of €0 and a 50% chance to gain €4 and a 50% chance to lose €4. 8 
-  Mean-preserving spread: To obtain this prospect, the two outcomes of the basic prospect 
were respectively increased and decreased by 25% of the sure amount. The expected value 
of the prospect thus remains the same; however, the variance of the prospect increases, and a 
loss equal to 25% of the sure amount is introduced into the prospect.  
-  Lottery choice: The prospect now remains identical to the basic prospect, but the safe 
payment is replaced by a prospect with a lower variance than the risky prospect. As an 
example in stake level 1, the safe payment of €2 would be replaced by a prospect with a 
50% chance to gain €3 and a 50% to obtain €1. 
-  Sensitivity down: Compared to the basic choice pair, the safe payment is reduced by 25% to 
assess the degree of risk aversion of subjects. 
-  Sensitivity up: Similar to “Sensitivity down”, but the safe payment is increased by 25%.  
-  Positive shift: Every amount is increased by 50% of the safe payment in the base category. 
E.g., in stake level 5, the safe payment is €15 and the prospect provides a 50–50 chance of 
€5 or €25. 
The five basic choice pairs, plus seven variations on each basic pair, thus give a total of 40 choices. 
For a complete overview of all prospect pairs, see Table 1 in the Appendix. 
 
Treatments. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. In the individual treatment, 
subjects took their decisions only for themselves. In the responsibility treatment, half of the subjects 
were randomly assigned the role of decision maker and the other half to the role of passive 
recipient. The decision maker was told that she had to take the decision on behalf of herself and 
another subject sitting in the laboratory, whose identity was not disclosed. All other subjects were 
told that they were in a passive role and that somebody else in the laboratory would take the 
decisions on their behalf. With a lag of one period, recipients were shown the decision problem and 
the choice of their corresponding decision maker. They could then indicate whether they were 
“satisfied” or “not satisfied” with the decision, but this did not affect payoffs nor was it shown to 
the decision maker.  
 
Incentives. 3 out of the 40 decisions were randomly drawn for every subject to be payoff relevant. 
To make the random mechanism behind lotteries as transparent as possible, we had one participant 
throw a dice for every lottery that determined what outcome of the lottery obtained. In the 
responsibility treatment, we implemented the payout procedure such that always three identical 




3.2 Results: choices under responsibility 
 
Prospect Choices: overview 
Before discussing treatment effects, it seems desirable to discuss general risk attitudes and how they 
change for the different types of prospects employed. In the base lotteries we find a considerable 
degree of risk aversion, with about 77% of subjects choosing the sure amount over the prospect 
with equal expected value. As one would expect, choices of the sure amount further increase when 
the sure amount is higher than the expected value of the prospect, and decrease when the sure 
amount is lower. When compared to the basic prospect pair all outcomes are moved upward by 50% 
of the sure amount, we observe increased choices of the prospect. This seems to indicate an 
heuristic according to which a prospect is deemed more acceptable when it assures at least a 
























Fig. 1: Choice frequency of safe prospect by prospect pair type and gender 
 
When the choice is between two non-degenerate prospects, choice frequencies of the sure prospect 
are increased, indicating a similar heuristic. For mixed prospects, the choice frequency of the sure 
amount is only slightly increased compared to the base category. For the mean-preserving spread, 
choices of the risky prospect increase, thus indicating that the increase in the good outcome more 
than makes up for the slight loss that has been introduced in the bad outcome. Finally, for pure loss 
choices, subjects are considerably more risk seeking than for gains, even though in a majority of 
cases subjects still choose the sure loss over the prospect.  
  It is also commonly found in the literature that risk attitudes are influenced by stake levels 
(Binswanger, 1980; Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992; Lefebvre, Vieider, & Villeval, 2010). We thus 10 
take a look at the influence of the different stake levels on decisions. Figure 2 shows choices for the 
safe alternative separately for the basic prospect pairs and the pure loss pairs. While the stake effect 
is clearly visible for the basic gain prospects, with increasing expected values resulting in increased 
levels of risk aversion, there is no clear trend for pure loss prospects, where risk aversion has only a 
very slight (and nonsignificant: p=0.43) tendency to increase with absolute stake values. A 

















Fig. 2: Stake effects for gains and losses 
 
 
Individual decisions versus Responsibility 
Figure 3 shows choice frequencies for the safe prospect by treatment, separately for males and 
females. One can clearly see how for the base choice pair subjects are more risk averse under 
responsibility than in the individual decisions—this holds both for males and females. The same 
tendency is visible in all other positive prospect pairs, except for the upward sensitivity choice pair, 
in which there is no difference. There is only a very slight indication of responsibility inducing 
more risk aversion in the mixed prospect choice pair, while this tendency is again more pronounced 
for the mean-preserving spread pair. For pure loss choices however, the tendency is inverted, with 
responsibility increasing risk seeking. 
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Fig. 3: Choice frequency of the safe prospect for different prospect pairs, by treatment and gender 
 
Table 1 presents a random effects Probit model regressing choices for the safe prospect on a variety 
of explanatory variables. All regressions are hierarchically fully specified in the sense of Jaccard & 
Turrisi (2003), whose terminology we adopt in what follows. Regression I regresses choices on the 
treatment dummy, a dummy variable indicating the pure loss prospects, and an interaction term 
between the latter two.  
 
Table 1: Random effects Probit Regression: coefficients show effects relative to choices in the individual treatment; *** 
represents significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at p=0.10 













EV difference    0.625*** 
(0.034) 
















Wald Chi2  35.04  392.33 
 
Being responsible for somebody else's payoffs as well as one's own increases risk aversion relative 12 
to being only responsible for one's own payoffs; the latter is a simple main effect, indicating the 
effect of responsibility for all prospects except the pure loss prospects (i.e., with the pure loss 
dummy held constant at zero). The effect of the pure loss dummy indicates that for pure loss 
prospects subjects are more risk seeking compared to all other prospects. The interaction between 
the treatment dummy and the one identifying pure loss prospects indicates that for pure loss 
prospects the effect of responsibility goes in the opposite direction compared to pure gain prospects, 
and thus shows that subjects in the responsibility treatment are more risk seeking for losses 
compared to subjects in the individual treatment. Finally, we also find that females are significantly 
more risk averse than males. Such an effect is commonly found for decision making under risk 
(Donkers, Melenberg, & Soest, 2001; Eckel & Grossman, 2008). 
  Regression II keeps the same independent variables as regression I, and adds the difference 
in expected value (defined as the expected value of the safe prospect minus the expected value of 
the risky prospect) and the difference in standard deviations (defined as the standard deviation of 
the risky prospect minus the standard deviation of the safe prospect). For both measures, the higher 
the difference between the safe prospect and the risky prospect, the more likely subjects will choose 
the safe prospect. The main treatment effects discussed above are stable, indicating increased risk 
aversion under responsibility in the gain domain, and increased risk seeking in the loss domain. 
 
 
Choice satisfaction of recipients and relative risk preferences  
In the responsibility treatment, recipients saw the decision maker's choice with one period lag and 
indicated whether they were satisfied with the decision or not. Although this rating was not 
incentivized, it may nevertheless give an indication of the extent to which decision makers adapted 
their decision to the commonly acceptable one, or correctly intuited which decision would be 
deemed more acceptable while doing so. 
  Table 2 shows a random effects Probit model regressing the recipient's satisfaction with each 
choice on a number of independent variables. The highly significant effect of the safe prospect 
being chosen by the decision maker shows that safe choices are deemed more satisfactory in the 
gain domain (this being a simple main effect measuring the effect of safe choices with the pure-loss 
dummy held constant at zero). While the fact that a prospect offers only negative outcomes per se 
does not affect satisfaction ratings, choosing the safe amount in pure loss prospects is generally not 
perceived as satisfactory by recipients. This finding confirms that risk seeking is deemed more 
acceptable than safe choices under losses. 
  Regression II confirms the stability of the findings we have just discussed, and adds some 
more variables. Mixed prospects result in generally lower satisfaction levels overall, providing an 13 
indication that there is more controversy over the correct decision when losses are involved as well 
as gains. Satisfaction levels are, however, generally higher when the safer option, i.e. a sure amount 
of €0, is chosen in the mixed prospect pairs, as indicated by the highly significant interaction effect. 
Choices are deemed more satisfactory the higher the difference in expected value, providing an 
indication that higher differences in expected value increase the agreement between decision 
makers and recipients on which choice is the best one. Finally, in keeping with previous findings on 
gender effects, women generally deem choices of the safe prospect as more satisfactory than 
choices of the risky prospect. 
 
Table 2: Random Effects Probit Regression:  coefficient indicate satisfaction levels relative to a choice of the risky 
prospect; ***represents significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 
Dep. Var.: satisfied with decision  I II 












Mixed prospect    –0.697*** 
(0.216) 






















Wald Chi2  196.08  230.85 
  
At the end of the experiment we asked subjects to rate their degree of risk aversion on a scale from 
being very risk seeking (1) to being very risk averse (6). This self-declared risk aversion correlates 
strongly with the number of safe choices taken in non-negative prospect pairs during the experiment 
itself. Self-declared risk attitudes are not significantly different between the two treatments (p=0.26; 
Mann-Whitney test, two-sided), nor is there a significant difference between decision makers and 
recipients in the responsibility treatment (p=0.72; Mann-Whitney test, two-sided). Finally, we also 
asked subjects to rate themselves according to their risk aversion relative to other participants in the 
experiment. The rating went from 1 (indicating that a subject considered herself to be amongst the 
four most risk-loving participants to 6 (indicating that a subject considered herself to be amongst 14 
the four most risk averse participants in the experiment). On average, decision makers in the 
responsibility treatment had a rating of 4.17, indicating that they considered themselves more risk 
averse than the median participant in the experiment, and thus ruling out that they may have 
considered recipients on average to be more risk averse than they are themselves. This finding 
corresponds to existing evidence according to which subjects generally consider others as more risk 
loving than themselves (Hsee & Weber, 1997). 
 
3.3 The effects of accountability 
We recruited 96 additional subjects to participate in a third treatment. The average age was 23.50 
years and 40% of subjects were female. The accountability treatment was constructed in a way 
identical to the responsibility treatment, except that decision makers were now told that one 
decision maker in each session (p=1/12) would be extracted at random at the end of the experiment 
and shown to a different room, where the recipient would be handed an overview of the decisions 
and given the opportunity to interrogate the decision maker about the reasons behind her choices. 
  Table 3 shows a random effects Probit regression of choices of the safe prospect on several 
explanatory variables. Effects of accountability are now measured relative to the responsibility 
treatment. Overall, accountability does not result in different choices compared to the responsibility 
treatment. This holds both for gain and loss prospects. The exception to the rule are mixed 
prospects, for which accountability results in a marked decrease in safe choices, indicating a 
reduction of loss aversion. 
 
Table 3: Random Effects Probit Regression: coefficients show effects relative to choices in the responsibility treatment; 
***represents significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 













mixed prospect    0.204** 
(0.077) 


















Wald Chi2  48.64  55.40 15 
 
Taking a closer look at the effects, we thus find no simple effect of accountability. As usual, we find 
more risk seeking for pure loss prospect pairs compared to gain prospects, but no effect of 
accountability on choices for the loss prospects. We find however a significant simple effect of 
mixed  prospects, indicating that under responsibility risk averse choices for mixed prospects are 
more frequent than for pure gain prospects at large. More interestingly, there is a significant 
interaction effect between accountability and the mixed prospect dummy, indicating that making 
subjects accountable reduces their choices of the safe alternative in mixed prospects significantly. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
Social acceptability of loss aversion 
We start our discussion by considering the effect of responsibility and accountability on loss 
aversion. We have seen that in general, subjects choose the safe option more often compared to 
choices in the basic prospect pair when prospects are mixed, i.e. losses can be incurred by choosing 
the risky prospect. This loss aversion effect is not further increased under conditions of 
responsibility. However, notwithstanding choice frequencies of the safe prospect of around 80% in 
the mixed prospect pairs, recipients are generally less satisfied with choices in mixed prospect pairs. 
Even though this effect is qualified by a higher acceptance for safe choices relative to risky choice 
in this kind of prospect pairs, overall the satisfaction level is lower for this kind of prospect pairs 
compared to the base case. This indicates that it seems less clear to subjects what kind of behavior 
is acceptable for mixed prospects. A further indication in this direction derives from the fact that 
loss aversion is radically reduced under accountability. 
  There are also some more subtle implications to be derived from this finding. An important 
distinction in the social psychology literature is the one between process and outcome 
accountability (Simonson & Staw, 1992; Vieider & Tetlock, 2010). Vieider (2009) also found loss 
aversion to be reduced by a process accountability requirement, asking subjects to justify their 
(individual) decision in front of the experimenter. Baltussen, van den Assem, & van Dolder (2010) 
on the other hand found accountability to increase loss aversion in individual decision tasks when 
decisions were observed by bystanders. The latter however use mere observation, where no reasons 
can be given to justify one's choice. Reason-giving in the spirit of  Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky 
(1993), implicit in process accountability, makes it easy to justify a decision when strong normative 
principles are there to underscore it, while no such justifications can be given when only outcomes 
are observed. In the latter case, it seems that attention is rather focused on how stupid one can look 
if a loss results that could have been avoided (Trautmann, Vieider, & Wakker, 2008). 
  We thus propose that our finding is explained by the fact that subjects who may have to 16 
explain their decisions to recipients recur to more careful consideration of the options at their 
disposal, and take the option that they deem normatively more justifiable more often (Tetlock, 1991; 
Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Vieider (2009) found that loss aversion in an individual decision 
making task was reduced by an accountability requirement. Subjects however had to justify their 
decision in front of the experimenter, were almost exclusively economics students, and the task was 
not incentivized. Since now the justification is to the recipient, subjects were from a variety of 
disciplines with economists constituting a minority (28%)
2, and choices were incentivized, the 
finding seems to have wider implications. Indeed it would seem like subjects, when motivated to 
consider their decisions more carefully, tend to identify loss aversion as a bias and to move away 
from it. It thus appears that loss aversion can easily be identified as a bias, such that subjects move 
away from it when sufficiently motivated to do so, as predicted by flexible self-correction models 
(Wegener & Petty, 1995). This raises interesting questions about the perceived normative status of 
typical decision making patterns under risk in general, which we discuss next. 
 
 
Decision under responsibility: cautious shift or accentuated probability weighting? 
For gain prospects, we find that responsibility increases risk aversion. This finding is indeed 
consistent with some early indications in the literature. Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) provided an 
indication that responsibility for others may induce increased risk aversion under equal payoffs, 
although their results failed to reach significance.  A similar indication derives from one possible 
explanation of the findings by Charness & Jackson (2009). While the former find this increased risk 
aversion for large-probability gains, the latter find it for small probability losses (assuming, as they 
do implicitly and quite plausibly, that the safe amount that can be had by deviating from the 
efficient equilibrium serves as a reference point). Neither of these findings however helps us answer 
the question of what may be the reason underlying such an increase risk aversion. 
  An account based on the assumption that decision makers consider others to be more risk 
averse than they are themselves seems to be ruled out by the answers to the relative risk attitude 
ranking questions discussed above. Also, Hsee & Weber (1997) found that in a series of different 
experimental designs subjects systematically predicted others to be more risk seeking than 
themselves. One possibility is that subjects comply to an implicit social rule dictating increased 
caution when responsible for somebody else as well as oneself, thus increasing their risk aversion 
when responsible for somebody else. Such a cautious shift explanation however cannot explain our 
increased risk seeking for loss prospects. Arguably, different social rules dictating a cautious shift 
                                                 
2Adding a dummy for economists and an interaction term for economists*accountability in the regressions does not 
produce any significant results. 17 
for gains and a 'risky shift' for losses could well exist, but such a hypothesis does have a distinctly 
ad hoc flavor. Given that individual risk attitudes have been established to be much richer than the 
simple risk-aversion/risk seeking dichotomy implicit in such explanations (Abdellaoui, 2000; 
Abdellaoui, l’Haridon & Zank, 2010; Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2000), we rather hypothesize that 'natural' 
risk attitudes found in individual decision making are accentuated under conditions or 
responsibility. 
   To be sure, prospect theory would predict risk aversion to prevail both for medium to large 
probabilities of a gain and for small probabilities of a loss, so that a theory based on the 
amplification of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory cannot be 
separated from an account based on a social rule favoring increased risk aversion under 
responsibility. Risk seeking, however, seems to appear more acceptable than risk aversion in the 
loss domain. Evidence in this direction comes both from the behavior of decision makers, who 
under conditions of responsibility are more risk seeking than in the individual treatment; and from 
recipients, who are much more likely to be dissatisfied with a decision in the loss domain when the 
decision maker chose the sure loss rather than the prospect. This, in turn, cannot be explained by a 
uniform social norm dictating increased caution under conditions of responsibility. 
  We thus propose that the probability weighting at the base of the fourfold pattern of risk 
aversion predicted by prospect theory is amplified by responsibility
3. Arkes (1991) indeed indicated 
probability weighting (as well as utility curvature) as a psychophysically–based error, which he thus 
predicted to be extremely resilient to debiasing. Seeing how responsibility seems to accentuate 
probability weighting, we take this conclusion one step further by hypothesizing that not only 
probability weighting is not easily identified as a bias by subjects; when sufficiently motivated to do 
so, subjects will on the contrary construct a naïve theory of bias that indicates their natural 
inclination to weight probabilities as too feeble, thus inducing them to accentuate their probability 
weighting when responsible for others. In other words, when pushed to think about it, subjects may 
see probability weighting—or the more elementary motives behind it—as normative, so that under 
responsibility they will be induced to accentuate probability weighting. A hint in this direction also 
comes from the fact that our accountability manipulation had no effect on either increased risk 
aversion for gains or increased risk seeking for losses under responsibility, which provides an 
indication that decision makers deem such behavior justifiable. 
  Notwithstanding the former arguments, the conclusion that responsibility accentuates 
                                                 
3This assumes linearity of the utility function, so that any changes in the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes are entirely 
reflected in the probability weighting function. Utility is indeed generally found to be linear for relatively small 
amounts such as the ones used in these experiments. However, our results do in no way depend on this assumption. 
Indeed, the same issue of decreasing sensitivity underlies outcome transformations and probability weighting (Tversky 
& Wakker, 1995), so that our conclusions do not change. It seems however more convenient to discuss changes in 
probability rather than “changes in probability weighting and/or utility curvature”. 18 
probability weighting is still rather speculative at this point. Indeed, there may be other explanations 
for the reversal in behavior under responsibility between gains and losses, e.g. the already discussed 
different social norms for decisions under gains and under losses. There may however be a 
possibility to disentangle such different explanations. The hypothesis of an accentuated fourfold 
pattern of risk attitudes as found in prospect theory and the social norm argument make very 
different predictions for different probability levels in the gain domain. For large probabilities, both 
prospect theory and the social norm argument predict an increase in risk aversion under conditions 
of responsibility. For small probabilities, the social norm hypothesis still predicts an increase in risk 
aversion. Quite to the contrary however, prospect theory and the probability weighting argument 
laid out above now predict an increase in risk seeking under conditions of responsibility. We thus 




4. Experiment 2: Disentangling social norm and flexible self-correction explanations 
4.1 Experimental Design 
 
Subjects. Overall, 180 subjects were recruited from a subject pool at Ludwig-Maximilian’s 
University in Munich, Germany, using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was run together 
with another, unrelated, experiment. 59% of subjects were female, and the average age was 23.88 
years. 
 
Task. During the experimental session, there were two tasks that were relevant to the current 
experiment. Task 1 was run at the outset of the experimental session, before any treatments were 
introduced, and consisted in the elicitation of risk attitudes using an adaptation of the method of 
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & l'Haridon (2008). Task 2 was run after another, unrelated experiment
4. In 
task 2, subjects were asked to choose between a safe option and a risky option in a fashion similar 
to experiment 1. However, we now only looked at choices in the gain domain. The safe option 
always consisted in a sure amount of money, while the prospect providing a chance of either 10% or 
90% to win €10. Overall, subjects had to take 10 choices where the order of presentation was 
randomized for every subject. Subjects took decisions sequentially and had no opportunity to return 
to an earlier decision to revise it. 
 
                                                 
4Although the experiment run between to two tasks was unrelated, care was taken to distribute the treatments of the 
second task orthogonally to the treatments in the other experiment. 19 
Prospects. The choice was always between a sure amount of money and a prospect. There were two 
prospects, one providing a 10% chance to win €10 and zero otherwise; and one providing a 90% 
chance to win €10 and zero otherwise. The sure amount could take one of five different amounts for 
each prospect: €0.8, €1, €1.2, €1.5 and €2 for the 10% prospect, and €7, €8, €8.5 €9, and €9.5 for 
the 90% prospect. 
 
Treatments. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatments that exactly mirrored those 
of experiment 1: an individual treatment in which subjects took their decisions only for themselves; 
or a responsibility treatment, in which half of the subjects were randomly assigned the role of 
decision maker and half the subjects were assigned the role of passive recipient. 
 
Incentives. One decision from task one was randomly extracted to be played for real pay. Since in 
the unrelated experiment subjects could obtain at least an approximate knowledge about their 
payoffs, we decided to fully reveal earnings from task 1 and the unrelated experiment after the latter 
was finished in order to be able to control for the exact income effect in a regression (rather than 
having unknown perceptions of earnings). After task 2 was finished, one decision from that task 
was randomly extracted for real pay. 
 
4.3 Results 
Individual decisions versus decisions under responsibility 
 





















Fig 4a: Choice frequency by treatment for p=0.1  Fig. 4b: Choice frequency by treatment for p=0.9 
 
Figures 3a and 3b display the choice frequencies by treatment separately for small and large 
probabilities. On average we find the typical pattern of risk seeking for small probabilities and risk 20 
aversion for large probabilities. Indeed, when the subjects face a choice between a prospect and a 
sure amount of equal expected value, only about 27% of subjects choose the sure amount for the 
10% probability, while 99% of subjects do so for the 90% probability. For the 10% probability, 
subjects who are responsible for somebody else choose the sure amount less often for all but the 
smallest two certain amounts. For the 90% probability, responsible subjects always choose the sure 
amount at least as often as decision makers who only decide for themselves. 
  Table 4 presents a random effects Probit model regressing choices of the safe alternative on 
a variety of explanatory variables. The effect of the responsibility treatment dummy now indicates 
the simple main effect of being responsible when probabilities are large (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). 
Subjects are thus more likely to choose the sure amount for a 90% probability of winning when 
responsible compared to the individual treatment. Under small probabilities, subjects are 
significantly more risk seeking than under large probabilities, as indicated by the highly significant 
effect of the small probability dummy. As shown by the interaction of the small-probability dummy 
with the treatment dummy, this risk-seeking tendency is further enhanced relative to the individual 
treatment when subjects are responsible for somebody else. As may be expected, the difference in 
expected value between the sure amount and the prospect is also highly significant. Finally, we find 
a significant, if small, income effect, which goes as expected in the direction of increased risk 
seeking by subjects who have realized higher earnings from the previous experiment. 
Table 4: Random Effects Probit Regression: coefficients show effects relative to choices in the individual treatment; 
*** represents significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 



























Female * small probability    –0.631* 
(0.198) 












Wald Chi2  263.90  263.57 21 
 
Regression II adds two further interaction terms. Almost all effects can be seen to be stable. The 
gender effect, which had not been significant in regression I, is now also significant: since this is a 
simple effect, the positive effect of the female dummy now indicates increased risk aversion by 
females relative to males for large probability prospects. This effect is qualified by the interaction of 
the female dummy with the small-probability dummy. The negative effect of that interaction shows 
that females are significantly more risk seeking relative to males for small probabilities. 
  Examining the certainty equivalents obtained in task 1 before subjects were assigned to 
treatments, we find that for the prospect giving a 10% probability of winning €10 and zero 
otherwise the certainty equivalents of subjects that were later assigned to the individual treatment 
and those that were later assigned to the responsibility treatment are not significantly different 
(p=0.94, two-sided Mann Whitney test). Also for the prospect affording a 90% chance of €10 or else 
nothing, certainty equivalents are not significantly different (p=0.41, two-sided Mann Whitney test). 
Explanations based on different initial risk attitudes are thus ruled out.  
 
Satisfaction ratings 
Exactly as in experiment 1, recipients in experiment 2 saw the decisions of their assigned decision 
maker with a lag of one period, and had to indicate whether they were satisfied with the decision or 
not. While once again these decisions were not incentivized, the recipients seem to have taken the 
task seriously—not least because this was their only occupation during the experiment. Table 6 
reports the results of a random effects Probit model regressing the satisfaction dummy on a number 
of explanatory variables.  
  The first dummy indicates the simple main effect of choosing the safe amount: choosing the 
safe amount for large probability prospects is deemed much more satisfactory in general than 
choosing the prospect. The dummy indicating the simple main effect of a small probability choice is 
also positive, indicating considerable agreement on choices in this instance. Choosing however the 
safe amount for small probability prospects is considered to be very dissatisfying, as shown by the 
large negative coefficient of the interaction effect. Recipients are in general less satisfied as the 
expected value difference increases under large probabilities, which is indicated by the simple effect 
of the relative dummy. They are however more satisfied with a choice of the safe alternative for 
large differences in expected value under large probabilities. Females tend to be much more 
satisfied when the safe amount is chosen over the large probability prospects, while past profits 




Table 5: Random Effects Probit Regression:  *** represents significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at 
p=0.10. 
Dep. Var.: satisfied with choice  I II 
























Female * safe choice    0.556* 
(0.262) 
















The social norm hypothesis and the probability weighting hypothesis make very different 
predictions on behavior for small probabilities in the gain domain. While for large probabilities both 
theories predict an increase in risk aversion under responsibility, for small probabilities the social 
norm argument predicts a cautious shift towards increased risk aversion (or at least reduced risk 
seeking), whereas the probability weighting argument predicts increased risk seeking. Having 
directly tested these contradictory predictions in experiment 2, we conclude that the social norm 
dictating a cautious shift under conditions of responsibility has been discredited as an explanation of 
the results: only an increased fourfold pattern of risk attitudes can explain our results.  
  This conclusion in turn lends support to our suspicion that subjects do not recognize 
probability weighting as a bias and may even perceive it to be normative. Indeed, when sufficiently 
motivated to so by bearing the responsibility of determining somebody else's outcomes as well as 
one's own, the naïve theory of a bias that subjects seem to form is that of being too moderate in their 
choices. When responsible for other subjects in the gain domain, they thus shift away from such 
positions, become more risk averse for large to medium sized probabilities, and more risk seeking 23 
for small probabilities. 
  Further support for the aura of normativity surrounding probability weighting also derives 
from our accountability manipulation in experiment 1. Vieider (2008) found that accountability did 
not influence either probability weighting or utility curvature in an individual decision making task. 
The fact that requiring subjects to potentially justify their decisions in front of somebody else who 
is directly affected by those decisions does not change the increased probability weighting observed 
under responsibility indicates that subjects perceive such behavior as legitimate and justifiable. 
Finally, the increased satisfaction ratings under such conditions indicate that the decisions makers' 
intuition is indeed correct: there is complete consensus on the acceptability of accentuated 
probability weighting. 
  A completely different picture emerges for loss aversion. While subjects tend to be on 
average more satisfied with safe choices in mixed prospects, there seems to be little consensus on 
the 'correct' or most acceptable choice, as indicated by the generally lower satisfactions levels for 
decisions concerning mixed prospects. This evidence is further reinforced in the accountability 
treatment, where decisions makers considerably reduce their choice of the safe outcome. It thus 
seems like loss aversion is generally recognized as a bias, and when the possibility of having to 
justify one's choice exists, choosing a mixed prospect implying the possibility of a loss is perceived 
as perfectly justifiable. 
  The differential nature of probability weighting and loss aversion may have important 
consequences for the debiasing of decision making processes. Indeed, decision puzzles that are 
caused by loss aversion—such as the endowment effect, the equity premium puzzle, or the 
willingness-to-accept willingness-to-pay discrepancy—may be relatively easy to debias; some 
evidence in this direction does indeed exist (Fellner & Sutter, 2009; List, 2004; Plott & Zeiler, 
2005). Issues deriving from probability weighting on the other hand may be more resilient. This in 
turn means that explicit rules may need to be introduced to reign in biases deriving such risk 
attitudes, or special training may be desirable for managers not to fall prey to decision patterns that 










We systematically explored decision situations in which a decision maker bears responsibility for 
somebody else's outcomes as well as for her own. In the gain domain we confirmed the intuition 
that being responsible for somebody else's payoffs increases risk aversion. Looking at risk attitudes 
in the loss domain however, we find an increase in risk seeking under responsibility. An additional 
accountability mechanism does not change risk behavior, except for mixed prospects, in which it 
reduces loss aversion. 
  This raises issues about the nature of various decision biases under risk, and to what extent 
changed behavior under responsibility may depend on a social norm of caution in situations of 
responsibility versus naive corrections from perceived biases. To further explore this issue, we 
designed a second experiment to explore risk-taking behavior for gain prospects offering very small 
or very large probabilities of winning. For large probabilities, we find increased risk aversion, thus 
confirming our earlier finding. For small probabilities however, we find an increase of risk seeking 
under conditions of responsibility. The latter finding thus discredits hypotheses of a social rule 
dictating caution under responsibility, and can be explained through flexible self-correction models 
predicting a shift in behavior that will depend on decision makers' naive theories of bias.  25 
Appendix 
A1. Tables 
Table 1: Overview of Lotteries 
 
   Option A ("Safe")    Option B ("Risky")      
Lottery  
















Right     Category 
1     1  2  0  0    0.5  4  0.5  0     Base 
2     0  0  1  -2    0.5  0  0.5  -4     Loss shift 
3     1  0  0  0    0.5  2  0.5  -2     Mixed 
4     0.5  3  0.5  1    0.5  4  0.5  0     Lottery 
5     1  2  0  0    0.5  5  0.5  -1     CE 
6     1  1.5  0  0    0.5  4  0.5  0     Sensitivity Down 
7     1  2.5  0  0    0.5  4  0.5  0     Sensitivity Up 
8     1  3  0  0    0.5  5  0.5  1     Positive Shift 
9     1  4  0  0    0.5  8  0.5  0     Base 
10     0  0  1  -4    0.5  0  0.5  -8     Loss shift 
11     1  0  0  0    0.5  4  0.5  -4     Mixed 
12     0.5  6  0.5  2    0.5  8  0.5  0     Lottery 
13     1  4  0  0    0.5  10  0.5  -2     CE 
14     1  3  0  0    0.5  8  0.5  0     Sensitivity Down 
15     1  5  0  0    0.5  8  0.5  0     Sensitivity Up 
16     1  6  0  0    0.5  10  0.5  2     Positive Shift 
17     1  6  0  0    0.5  12  0.5  0     Base 
18     0  0  1  -6    0.5  0  0.5  -12     Loss shift 
19     1  0  0  0    0.5  6  0.5  -6     Mixed 
20     0.5  9  0.5  3    0.5  12  0.5  0     Lottery 
21     1  6  0  0    0.5  15  0.5  -3     CE 
22     1  4.5  0  0    0.5  12  0.5  0     Sensitivity Down 
23     1  7.5  0  0    0.5  12  0.5  0     Sensitivity Up 
24     1  9  0  0    0.5  15  0.5  3     Positive Shift 
25     1  8  0  0    0.5  16  0.5  0     Base 
26     0  0  1  -8    0.5  0  0.5  -16     Loss shift 
27     1  0  0  0    0.5  8  0.5  -8     Mixed 
28     0.5  12  0.5  4    0.5  16  0.5  0     Lottery 
29     1  8  0  0    0.5  20  0.5  -4     CE 
30     1  6  0  0    0.5  16  0.5  0     Sensitivity Down 
31     1  10  0  0    0.5  16  0.5  0     Sensitivity Up 
32     1  12  0  0    0.5  20  0.5  4     Positive Shift 
33     1  10  0  0    0.5  20  0.5  0     Base 
34     0  0  1  -10    0.5  0  0.5  -20     Loss shift 
35     1  0  0  0    0.5  10  0.5  -10     Mixed 
36     0.5  15  0.5  5    0.5  20  0.5  0     Lottery 
37     1  10  0  0    0.5  25  0.5  -5     CE 
38     1  7.5  0  0    0.5  20  0.5  0     Sensitivity Down 
39     1  12.5  0  0    0.5  20  0.5  0     Sensitivity Up 














A3. Prospect type regression 
 
Random Effects Probit Regression: coefficients show effects relative to choices in the basic prospect pair; *** 
represents significance at p=0.001, ** at p=0.01, * at p=0.05, and † at p=0.10. 
Dep. Var: choice of safe 
prospect 
I II  III 




























































Wald Chi2  510.18  515.91  587.36 
 
Table 1 shows a random effects Probit model, with coefficients indicating the deviation of choices 
with respect to the basic prospect pair. In addition to the effects already discussed above, it shows 
that females are on average significantly more risk averse than males. Also, risk aversion increases 
with age. Both findings are commonly found in decision making under risk (Donkers, Melenberg, 
& Soest, 2001; Eckel & Grossman, 2008). More interestingly, we find an effect of stake size, 
represented by the expected value of the prospect (taken in absolute terms for the pure loss 
prospect). The higher the stakes of the decision, the more risk averse subjects become on average. 
This is in agreement with general findings in the literature (Binswanger, 1980; Kachelmeier & 
Shehata, 1992; Lefebvre, Vieider, & Villeval, 2010). Controlling for stake effects also makes the 
effect of the mixed prospects much more significant. This increased effect derives from the fact that 
the mixed prospects are obtained by adjusting the expected value of the prospect downward from 
the basic prospect pair. Since subjects tend to be less risk averse for lower stakes, the increased risk 
aversion found for mixed prospects appears more relevant once one controls for the decreased 
stakes in those choice pairs. 28 
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